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POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: LET THE
BROKER BEWARE

I.

Introduction

Real estate brokers' are prime targets of litigation 2 by dissatisfied
1. For purposes of this Note, the terms "real estate broker" or "broker"
include persons representing the seller in the sale of residential property, including
real estate salespersons, sales agents, real estate agents, listing brokers, selling
brokers and realtors. For a discussion of each of these positions, see generally R.
KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 90-102 (8th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
KRATOVIL & WERNER]. New York Real Property Law article 12-A, § 440(1) sets
forth the definition of a real estate broker as follows: "[B]roker means any person,
firm or corporation, who, for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable
consideration, lists for sale, sells, at an auction or otherwise, exchanges, buys or
rents, or offers or attempts to negotiate a sale, at an auction or otherwise, exchange,
purchase or rental of an estate or interest in real estate . . . ...
N.Y. REAL. PROP.
LAW § 440 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
Brokers earn fees or commissions by bringing purchasers and sellers togetherin essence serving as a catalyst in sales transactions. See Ryan v. Walker, 35 Cal.
App. 116, 169 P. 417 (1917). For a general discussion of a real estate broker's
role in a typical transaction, see infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
2. The number of lawsuits filed against real estate brokers has increased
dramatically in recent years due to significant increases in the number of brokers,
the high visibility of the broker in a transaction and the general perception of
brokers as "deep pockets." See F. FISHER, BROKER BEWARE: SELLING REAL ESTATE
WITHIN THE LAW ix (1981) [hereinafter FISHER]; see also N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1986,
at 1, col. 4 (discussing expansion of tort liability for real estate brokers).
Many jurisdictions have recently addressed the issue of real estate broker liability
in a misrepresentation action based on a broker's failure to inform a prospective
purchaser of defects in residential real estate. These jurisdictions include Alabama,
see Dexter v. Baker, 382 So. 2d 552 (Ala. 1980); Alaska, see Bevins v. Ballard
655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982); Arkansas, see Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burghoff, 19
Ark. App. 176, 718 S.W.2d 469 (1986);._California, see Easton v. Strassburger,
152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Colorado, see Caldwell v.
Armstrong, 642 P.2d 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Delaware, see Lock v. Schreppler,
426 A.2d 856 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); District of Columbia, see Berman v. Watergate
West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); Florida, see Ellis v. Flink, 374 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 1979); Georgia, see U-Haul Co. v. Dillard Paper Co., 169 Ga. App. 280,
312 S.E.2d 618 (1983); Hawaii, see Shaffer v. Earl Thacker Co., 716 P.2d 163
(Haw. Ct. App. 1986); Illinois, see Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 138 Ill. App.
3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 855 (1985); Iowa, see Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa
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purchasers3 of residential real estate.4 A purchaser who discovers
a physical defect 5 in the property purchased after title has

1985); Kansas, see Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 720 P.2d 660
(1986); Louisiana, see Joseph v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982),
cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983); Maine, see Emerson v. Ham, 411 A.2d
687 (Me. 1980); Massachussetts, see Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307, 446 N.E.2d 674
(1983); Michigan, see Hammond v. Matthes, 109 Mich. App. 352, 311 N.W.2d
357 (1981); Minnesota, see Baker v. Surman, 361 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Missouri, see Maples v. Porath, 638 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Montana, see Hoefer v. Wilckens, 684 P.2d 468 (Mont. 1984); Nebraska, see Suzuki
v. Gateway Realty, 207 Neb. 562, 299 N.W.2d 762 (1980); New Hampshire, see
Duby v. Apple Town Realty, Inc., 120 N.H. 438, 417 A.2d 1 (1980); New Mexico,
see Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 101 N.M. 572, 686
P.2d 262 (1984); Ohio, see Sanfillipo v. Rarden, 24 Ohio App. 3d 164, 493 N.E.2d
991 (1985); Pennsylvania, see Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 355 Pa. Super.
268, 484 A.2d 126 (1984); South Carolina, see May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549,
347 S.E.2d 508 (1986); Tennessee, see Hughey v. Rainwater Partners, 661 S.W.2d
690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Texas, see Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618
S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981); Utah, see Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980);
Vermont, see Provost v. Miller, 144 Vt. 67, 473 A.2d 1162 (1984); Washington,
see Hoffman v. Connall, 43 Wash. App. 532, 718 P.2d 814 (1986), rev'd, 108
Wash. 2d 69, 736 P.2d 242 (1987); West Virginia, see Lengyel v. Lint, 280 S.E.2d
66 (W. Va. 1981); Wisconsin, see Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d
804 (1983); and Wyoming, see Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1985).
3. Commentators have characterized purchasers of residential real estate as
naive or uninformed. See generally Note, Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate
Brokerage: Conflicts of Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REv. 379, 380-81 (1982) (residential real estate purchasers described as "the unsophisticated segment of the real estate market").
4. As used in this Note, "residential real estate" includes one-family residences
and multi-family residences comprised of up to six units. This Note makes no
distinction among city, suburban or rural residences. While larger multi-family
properties are also residential in nature, they are characterized as commercial real
estate because of their higher property value and greater transactional complexity.
See A.

ARNOLD

&

J.

KUSNET,

THE ARNOLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE

692

(1978) [hereinafter ARNOLD & KUSNET].
For the purposes of this Note, residential real estate refers to used housing as
opposed to new construction. New housing construction has been characterized as
a "product" introduced into the stream of commerce and is therefore subject to
a products liability analysis. For a discussion of the application of products liability
to real estate brokers in the sale of new housing, see Note, Products Liability
Applies to the Sale of Housing and Extends to All Parties Who Are an Integral
Partof the OverallProduction and Marketing Enterprise,Including Realtors. Berman
v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978), 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 887
(1979) [hereinafter Products Liability]. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
5. The term "physical defect" encompasses a wide variety of problems that
can occur with residential property, including but not limited to (1) structural
problems, compare Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983) (real estate broker's knowledge of house and
its history, and subsequent failure to communicate to buyers information concerning
crack in foundation constituted breach of duty sufficient to subject him to liability
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closed 6 may attempt to recover his losses from the real estate broker
who handled the transaction. 7 Traditionally, a real estate broker
was protected from such litigation by the legal theory of caveat
emptor-"let the buyer beware." '8 Courts and commentators, how-

in negligent misrepresentation) with De Soto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (broker not liable for fraud or negligence although real estate company for
which broker worked had notation in its files concerning defects in foundation);
(2) flooding, see Baker v. Surman, 361 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (directed
verdict for real estate broker who saw property only once even though house later
proved to have leaky basement); (3) sewer and septic tank problems, see Lyons v.
Christ Episcopal Church, 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 389 N.E.2d 623 (1979) (real estate
broker's actions as conduit in passing on seller's inaccurate information in regard
to connection to city sewerage system did not afford basis on which recovery could
be had against broker); (4) termites, see May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 347
S.E.2d 508 (1986) (broker liable in fraud action for termite damage); (5) boundaries,
see Shaffer v. Earl Thacker Co., 716 P.2d 163 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (real estate
broker representing seller of residential real property liable to buyer in innocent
misrepresentation action for reciting inaccurate information about property boundaries and lack of encroachments); and (6) water supply, see Bevi ns v. Ballard, 655
P.2d 757 *(Alaska 1982) (buyer who relied on material misrepresentation concerning
home's water supply had cause of action against real estate broker who communicated misrepresentation even though representation was innocently made).
6. The seller transfers the deed (title to the property) to the purchaser at the
closing. See Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper RoleServices-Compensation, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 581, 590 (1979) (Report
of the Special Committee on Residential Real Estate Transactions of the American
Bar Association) [hereinafter Special Committee]. The parties also make all required
payments and conclude all formal aspects to the transaction at that time. See id.
At the closing, the purchaser acquires a possessory' interest in the property and
title is closed. See M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 5.1, at 627-640 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN].
7. See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982); Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Shaffer v. Earl Thacker
Co., 716 P.2d 163 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986). Although the seller is frequently a
defendant in an action by the purchaser, with the broker and the seller both bearing
liability in proportion to his fault, the broker may be responsible for the entire
judgment. See generally W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 322-55 (5th ed. 1984) (discussion of
joint tortfeasors) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Many jurisdictions have adopted
the rule of joint and several liability, under which each individual defendant is
liable for the entire amount of the judgment, regardless of fault. See id. Once the
individual pays more than his proportionate share of the judgment, he may seek
contribution from the other defendant(s). See id. When the seller is insolvent,
however, the solvent broker will be responsible for the entire judgment. See id.
§ 52, at 345-55.
8. In full, the Latin maxim reads "Caveat Emptor, qui ignorare non debuit
quod jus alienum emit," meaning let a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of
the amount and nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper
caution. H. BROOME, LEGAL MAXIMS 590 (7th ed. 1900). For a discussion of the
origin and history of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
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ever, have criticized caveat emptor as inapplicable to contemporary
society 9 and its acceptance as a defense in real property transactions
has been substantially eroded. 10
As courts moved away from the strict application of caveat emptor
in real estate transactions, dissatisfied purchasers brought actions in
tort for misrepresentation against real estate brokers."' Initially, courts
considered only those actions premised on a theory of intentional
misrepresentation 2 in suits against a real estate broker. Subsequently,
some courts 3 permitted purchasers to base their actions on negligent
misrepresentation.1 4 A minority of courts 5 later recognized the tort
of innocent misrepresentation in the real estate broker liability context. '

6

To prevail in any misrepresentation action, a purchaser must prove
the elements of each tort-including proof that a real estate broker

9. See Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 614-16 (Alaska 1980). See generally
supra note 6, § 1.2(n), at 37-71; Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961).
10. For a discussion of the reduced application of caveat emptor in real property
transactions, see Jacobson, Broker's Liability for Sale of Defective Homes: The
Decline of Caveat Emptor, 52' L.A. B.J. 346 (1977). As one court stated, the rule
of caveat emptor has no application to dealings between a broker and a party to
the exchange of realty because the relation is based on utmost confidence and
good faith. See Lent-Agnew Realty Co. v. Trebert, 212 A.D. 460, 462, 208 N.Y.S.
598, 599 (4th Dep't 1925).
11. The dissatisfied purchaser was forced to use a tort action against his seller
because the purchase and sale of real estate carries no warranties other than title.
For a discussion of liability under a warranty theory, see Freyfogle, Real Estate
Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1985)
[hereinafter Freyfogle]. When the seller has already invested the proceeds in another
house, a purchaser will attempt to recover against the broker who is either insured
or whose assets are more liquid. See generally FIsIER, supra note 2.
This Note is concerned only with misrepresentations by real estate brokers that
cause purchasers to suffer pecuniary loss. Because courts have always been more
reluctant to impose liability for this kind of loss than to impose liability for direct
physical injury or property damage, special rules have evolved governing misrepresentations that result in only pecuniary losses to the real estate purchaser. See
generally Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231
(1966) [hereinafter Prosser].
12. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 101 N.M.
572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984) (recognizing cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
against broker if broker fails to exercise reasonable care).
14. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (liability for innocent
misrepresentation extends to real estate broker when buyer relied on material
misrepresentation).
16. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
FRIEDMAN,
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owes him some duty.' 7 A purchaser may have difficulty proving that
a broker owes him a duty to refrain from making an affirmative
misrepresentation or to disclose the existence of a defect. 8 The
courts, however, by broadening the basis 9 of a broker's duty to a
20
prospective purchaser have eased the purchaser's burden of proof.
For example, some courts have found that a broker owes a duty
to a purchaser only when the broker and purchaser have created
an agent-principal relationship. 2' Other courts have found that a
broker owes a duty to a purchaser when public policy, 22 statutory
language, 23 ethical codes, 24 or malpractice case law 25 dictate that such
a duty should exist. Courts have thus lessened the purchaser's burden
of proof in some instances. The purchaser's proof of a broker's
duty has, however, to a great extent, depended on the court's
interpretation of the basis upon which a broker owes a duty to a
26

prospective purchaser.
Courts have also differed over the scope of the duty a broker
owes a purchaser. 2 7 For example, while some courts have held that
a broker does not have the duty to investigate the truth of a seller's

17. See infra notes 58, 65 and 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the elements of intentional, negligent and innocent misrepresentation.
18. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 90-154 and accompanying text.
21. See Lerk v. McCabe, 349 Ill. 348, 182 N.E. 388 (1932) (holding that broker
owes duty to purchaser based on agency relationship). For a discussion of agency
as a basis for a real estate broker's duty to a purchaser, see infra notes 90-104
and accompanying text.
22. See Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that real estate
broker's duty is, to certain extent, determined by public policy). For a discussion
of public policy as a basis for a real estate broker's duty to a purchaser, see infra
notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
23. See Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that
real estate broker owes duty to purchaser based on state consumer protection
statute). For a discussion of state statutes used as a basis for a real estate broker's
duty to a purchaser, see infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
24. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)
(basing broker's duty in part on National Association of Realtor's Code of Ethics).
For a discussion of ethical codes as a basis for a real estate broker's duty to a
purchaser, see infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
25. See Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985) (purchaser brought
malpractice action against broker). For a discussion of malpractice as a basis for
a real estate broker's duty to a purchaser, see infra notes 145-53 and accompanying
text.
26. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
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representation, 2 other courts have held that a broker has an affirmative duty to inspect the property and disclose any defects discovered. 29 In sum, current case law is divided on the issues of: (1)
the level of culpability required to find broker liability; (2) the basis
of a real estate broker's duty to a prospective purchaser; and (3)
the scope of any duty a broker owes to a prospective purchaser. 0
This Note examines, these three areas of current controversy and
recommends state legislation that will clarify the law. As background,
Part II examines the role of the real estate broker in a typical
residential transaction. Part III surveys tortious misrepresentation in
the context of real estate broker liability and the source and scope
of the duty owed by a real estate broker to a prospective purchaser
of residential real estate. Part IV analyzes the policy considerations
for imposing broker liability for misrepresentation and concludes
that courts should not impose broker liability for innocent misrepresentation, nor should courts impose an affirmative duty of inspection and disclosure upon real estate brokers. Finally, this Note
recommends that state legislatures take some action to prevent the
transfer of defective real estate and thus protect home-buyers, without
imposing liability on an innocent broker.
II. A Real Estate Broker's Role in a Typical Residential Real
Estate Transaction
Many courts have examined the broker's role in the real estate
transaction to determine the broker's liability for misrepresentation."a
Although a broker's primary role is that of a sales agent,3 2 a broker

28. See, e.g., Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burghoff, 19 Ark. App. 176, 718 S.W.2d
469 (1986) (broker not liable for constructive or legal fraud when representation
to purchaser was only good faith repetition of statement authorized by seller).
29. See Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 101 N.M. 572,
686 P.2d 262 (1984) (broker may have duty to disclose defects that inspection
would reveal); cf. De Soto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (court
refused to determine precise scope of duties owed by broker to purchaser).
30. Because they are result-oriented, courts increasingly further the trend towards
greater broker liability for misrepresentations made to prospective purchasers. See,
e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (because of nature of brokerpurchaser relationship, liability for innocent misrepresentation merited); Gauerke v.
Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983) (public policy may dictate placement
of loss on innocent broker).
31. See, e.g., Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d 172, 485 N.E.2d
855 (1985) (examining relationship between purchaser and real estate broker); Walter
v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1985) (describing role of broker in ordinary
transaction).
32. See KRATOVI. & WERNER, supra note 1, at 93.

133

BROKER BEWARE

1988]

may perform a variety of other functions in a transaction.3 3 A brief
description of a typical residential real estate transaction follows.
Once a seller decides to sell residential real estate through a broker,
the seller generally 34 enters into a written agreement35 with the broker.
The broker3 6 then shows the property to prospective purchasers and

33. See B.

HENZEY

& R.

FRIEDMAN, REAL ESTATE LAW

341 (1984) (describing

function of broker in residential real estate transaction) [hereinafter

HENZEY

&

FRIEDMAN].

34. Real estate purchase procedures vary greatly across the country. See Special
Committee, supra note 6, at 583.
35. Although a typical statute of frauds requires a contract to be in writing
and signed by the party to be charged if the contract cannot be fulfilled within
one year of the date it is signed, the majority of states has no writing requirement
in its statute of frauds regarding an employment contract between a real estate
broker and his principal. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-9-2 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-101 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-112 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-550 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714 (1975); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.01 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE
ANN. § 13-5-30 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59 paras. 1, 2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 &
Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.32 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-106
(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 51 (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-101 to 5-108 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.04 (West 1947); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 15-3-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.010 (Vernon 1949); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 111.220 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:1-2 (1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 22-1, 22-2
(1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1987); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page
1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 136 (West 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§§ 1-8 (Purdon 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 53-8-2 (1980 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101 (1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 181 (1973 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 55-1-1 (1981);
WYO. STAT. § 1-23-105 (Supp. 1987).
A number of states, however, provide within their statutes of frauds that a
broker's contract must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (1983); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (1967);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624[d] (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 9-508 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-2-2-1 (Burns 1980); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.010[8] (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1986); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, § 7 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 566.132 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903[e] (1986); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 36-107 (1984); N.J. STAT. Am. § 25:1-9 (West 1940); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 41.580[7] (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-416] (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-54[5] (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(6a) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.010[5]
(West 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 240.10 (West 1987).
The better practice for both the seller and the broker is to reduce their agreement
to writing. This writing should contain the following information: (1) the names
of the parties; (2) a description of the property; (3) the amount of the commission
and the conditions precedent to its accrual; (4) any specific provision addressing
the nature of the listing, such as an exclusive right to sell; and (5) the duration
of the agreement. See generally P. ROHAN, B. GOLDSTEIN & C. BOBIS, 10 REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.03 (1986).
36. A broker will usually obtain a right to market the seller's home through
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receives offers on behalf of the seller.37 When the broker finds a
potential purchaser, negotiations between the seller and purchaser
begin, with the broker acting as an intermediary.3" After the seller
accepts the purchaser's offer, the parties to the transaction subscribe
a sales contract.3 9 Upon the execution of the contract, the purchaser
generally attempts to secure financing"' through a lending institution."
Once the purchaser obtains financing, the parties set a closing date"2

a multiple listing service agreement, which gives a "listing broker" an exclusive
right to sell for three to six months. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987, § 8 (Real
Estate), at 1, col. 1. The listing broker is the broker who obtained the listing from
the seller and has actually contracted with the seller. See generally HENZEY &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 329-35. A selling broker, by contrast, is the broker
who obtains the offer to buy from the purchaser. See id. The selling broker and
the listing broker can be the same person. See id. When two brokers are involved,
any commission is split proportionately according to custom in the area or by the
terms of the multiple listing agreement. See id.
37. The broker, as the seller's agent, solicits offers from a purchaser and then
reports that offer to the seller. See HENZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 33536. Unlike a "pure" agency relationship, in which the agent has the power to
negotiate and bind his principal to a contract, the seller, not the broker, accepts
or rejects the offer made by the prospective purchaser. See id.
38. See Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (broker carries
on negotiations as intermediary between seller and purchaser).
39. A basic residential sales contract sets forth the identity of the parties,
describes the property to be sold, recites the promise to sell and buy, lists the
purchase price and the method by which it is payable and sets a closing date. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 1.2(b), at 5-6.
It is prudent for both the seller and the purchaser to engage the services of a
knowledgeable real estate attorney before entering any real estate transaction. See
Special Committee, supra note 6, at 581 (American Bar Association recognizes that
it is essential for parties to be represented by their own attorneys in order to
protect their interests). The attorney's participation in the transaction may include
counseling as to (1) the selection of the property; (2) the manner in which the
purchaser should take title; and (3) the terms of the transaction. See id. at 58490. The attorney may also prepare documents, advise purchasers of the consequences
of the transaction, analyze financing arrangements and explain land use restrictions.
See id.
40. In 1982, the overwhelming majority of American families paid for its homes
with borrowed money. See Mortgage and Housing Update, REAL EST. Q., 3-4
(Summer 1983).
41. For a detailed discussion of institutional financing, see Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the
Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transactions,
70 VA. L. REv. 1083 (1984) [hereinafter Eskridge].
42. A closing date is set to appoint a time and place for the delivery of the
deed and the payment of the purchase price, and for adjustment of expenses incident
to the transfer of the ownership interest. See generally HENZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 33, at 229-38. By establishing a date and place for the closing, the parties
know in advance when they must complete their obligations under the contract.
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and assemble the necessary documents"3 to complete the transaction.
At any time during these events, a broker may assist in the
valuation of the property," serve as an escrow agent, 45 or procure
papers essential to the transaction.4 6 Thus, a broker has a highly
visible role in most residential real estate transactions. Because of
this visibility, if a purchaser discovers a serious, previously undisclosed defect 47 in the property after closing, the purchaser is likely
4
to file suit against the broker. 1

III.

A Purchaser's Suit Against a Broker

A purchaser may sue a real estate broker under several theories
of liability.4 '9 To prevail in any action, however, the purchaser must
prove the prima facie elements of the action.50 One of the most

nebulous elements in an action in misrepresentation is that of duty.5"

For a discussion of purchasers' and sellers' performance obligations, see id, at 22937.
43. The purchaser should obtain the following documents prior to closing: (1)
a title report (which informs the purchaser of the limitations, if any, that impair
title); (2) title insurance (which protects the purchaser against loss incurred because
of defective title); (3) a survey (to ascertain whether the legal description of the
land conforms to the lines marked on the property); and (4) a termite inspection.
See Special Committee, supra note 6, at 587-89. In a typical transaction, the lender
will require presentation of these documents at the closing in order to protect his
security interest in the property. See id. at 587-89.
44. See HENZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 341 (brokers may act as
professional appraisers).
45. See id. (brokers receive and disburse funds through their escrow accounts).
46. See id. (brokers may apportion taxes, obtain payoff figures for existing
mortgages from lenders and assemble documents).
47. See supra note 5.
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Even when the broker is not
originally named in the purchaser's action, the broker may become a party to the
suit because the seller may implead him. See generally J. FRIBDENTHAL, M. KANE
& A. MILLER, Crvu PROCEDURE § 6.8, at 357-60 (1985).
49. A broker may be sued for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence or
misrepresentation. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 73640 (discussing misrepresentation and nondisclosure). Because most actions are based
on a real estate broker's misrepresentation or nondisclosure of facts pertaining to
a particular transaction in question, these causes of action can generally be characterized as tortious misrepresentation. See id. (party may be liable for words or
acts that create false impression through active misrepresentation or passive misleading). For a discussion of a possible contract action against a real estate broker
under an implied warranty theory, see Freyfogle, supra note 11. The most common
cause of action against a real estate broker lies in tort; such action is the subject
of this Note.
50. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 37-38, at 235-42.
51. See Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("courts

have historically struggled with the nature and source of real estate broker and
agents' duties"), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983).
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Courts have struggled to define the basis of the duty a broker owes
to the purchaser and the scope of that duty5 2 The discussion below
examines: (1) the tort of misrepresentation in the real estate broker
54
liability context;53 (2) the basis of the broker's duty to the purchaser;
and (3) the scope of the broker's duty. 5
A.

Tortious Misrepresentation

A residential real estate purchaser who suffers pecuniary loss after
purchasing defective real estate5 6 usually brings an action against a
broker in tort for intentional, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation. 7 Because courts fail to apply these tort theories consistently
in the real estate broker liability context, a brief discussion of the
history and merits of each form of misrepresentation follows.
1. Intentional Misrepresentation
The nine elements of the tort of intentional misrepresentation in

the real estate broker liability context are: (1) that a representation
was made; (2) that the representation was false; (3) that the rep-

resentation was material to the purchaser's transaction; (4) that the
broker made the representation and knew it to be false or did not
know it to be true; (5) that the broker intended the purchaser to
rely on it; (6) that the purchaser did not know that it was false;
(7) that the purchaser relied on its truth; (8) that the purchaser was
reasonable in his reliance; and (9) that the purchaser's reliance
proximately caused him injury. 8 Historically, this cause of action

was available to the purchaser only when a broker had made an
affirmative misrepresentation 59-it was not available in the case of
52. See id. at 1185 (" 'precise duties of a real estate broker must be determined
by an examination of the nature of the task the real estate agent undertakes to
perform' ") (quoting Latter & Blum, Inc. v. Richmond, 388 So. 2d 368, 372 (La.
1980)).
53. See infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 85-156 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 5.
57. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
58. See Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz. 430, 434, 420 P.2d 564, 568 (1966); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526, at 59 (1977) (listing conditions under which
particular representation is fraudulent).
59. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 106, at 737 (nondisclosure not
actionable); see also Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling
Defective Housing, 99 HARv. L. Rv. 1861, 1862-66 (1986) (outlining doctrinal
bases courts have used to impose broker liability) [hereinafter Imposing Tort
Liability].
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an intentional nondisclosure. 6° Eventually, however, courts broadened
the scope of this cause of action to include any intentional mis-

representation regardless of whether the misrepresentation was an
6
affirmative statement or an omission. 1
It is true that no contemporary court would question a broker's
liability when the broker has made an actual misrepresentation of
a material fact concerning the property. 62 Nevertheless, the purchaser
is often unable to bear the burden of proof necessary to prevail in
such an action. 63 Thus, when the purchaser cannot prove intentional

misrepresentation, he may bring an action for negligent misrepresentation or innocent misrepresentation-depending on which form
of action the court will recognize in a suit for misrepresentation

against a real estate broker. 64
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
The elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation are: (1)
the broker owed a duty to the purchaser; (2) the broker breached
that duty; (3) harm resulted as a breach of that duty; and (4) the

broker's misrepresentation or nondisclosure was the proximate cause
65
of the harm.
Historically, in the absence of some fiduciary relationship 66 between
the parties, courts refused to find that a remedy existed for a negligent
misrepresentation 67 made in any transaction when the defendant had
asserted the representation in good faith and the only resulting harm

60. See Freyfogle, supra note 11, at 6-7.
61. See Note, Johnson v. Davis: New Liability for Fraudulent Nondisclosure
in Real Property Transactions, 11 NOVA L.J. 145, 145-50 (1987); see also Lingsch
v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963) (broker liable for
"negative fraud" when he fails to disclose material facts).
62. See, e.g., May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 347 S.E.2d 508 (1986) (broker
who intentionally misrepresented existence of termites in property held liable).
63. See Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 59, at 1863 (purchaser has difficulty
proving that broker made certain representations, knowingly lied and intended that
purchaser rely on statements).
64. As a matter of common sense, a purchaser will bring the form of action
that implicates the lowest burden of proof, provided that the court recognizes that
form of action.
65. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 30, at 164; see also id. §§ 107,
108, at 740.
66. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of a fiduciary
relationship and its inherent obligations.
67. A broker negligently misrepresents when he makes the representation
without exercising reasonable care to ascertain its truth, makes it carelessly as to
manner of expression or makes it without the skill and competence required of
the profession. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 234.
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was pecuniary loss. 6 Gradually, courts expanded the application of

negligent misrepresentation to include any case in which a "special
relation" existed between the parties. 69 Many courts now recognize
the tort of negligent misrepresentation for both affirmative statements70

and for nondisclosures7 in the real estate broker liability context.7 2

Thus, a real estate broker may be liable for negligent misrepresentation when he fails to use reasonable care in ascertaining the truth
of the representation, even if he honestly believes it to be true. 73
3.

Innocent Misrepresentation

If the purchaser is unable to meet the burden of proof for the
tort of intentional misrepresentation 74 or negligent misrepresentation, 75 he may try to premise his action against the broker on innocent
misrepresentation. 76 The elements of the tort of innocent misrep-

68. See generally Goodhart, Liability for Negligent Misstatements, 78 LAW Q.
107, 111-13 (1962).

REV.

69. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465 (bank that
made negligent misrepresentation causing pecuniary loss to customer had duty to

exercise reasonable care in making representation);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 522 (1984).
70. See, e.g., First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty, Inc.,
19 Wash. App. 275, 574 P.2d 1211 (1978) (broker liable for negligent misrepresentation of boundary line of property offered for sale).
71. See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1963) (broker liable for nondisclosure of defects in property).
72. The courts have been willing to allow recovery for negligent misrepresentation
when the defendant made his statements in the course of his business or profession,
and he had a pecuniary interest in the transaction. See, e.g., Amato v. Rathbun
Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 647 P.2d 433 (1982). The Amato court relied on § 552
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to hold that a broker's duty is not limited
to failure to convey information within his actual knowledge. See id. at 232, 647
P.2d at 434.
73. See Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 111. App. 3d 257, 260, 389 N.E.2d
623, 625 (1979) ("rule we follow would permit a finding of fault only in situations
where the real estate agent knew or should have known that the representation
might be false"); Hoffman v. Connall, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 77, 736 P.2d 242, 246
(1987) (if broker willfully or negligently conveys false information about real estate
to buyer, broker is liable therefore); accord Amato, 98 N.M. at 232-33, 647 P.2d
at 434-35 (recognizing cause of action against broker who fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating information).
74. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76. Section 552C(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of
innocent misrepresentation as follows:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes
a misrepresentation of material fact for the purpose of inducing another
to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability
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resentation are: (1) the broker made a misrepresentation of material
fact for the purpose of inducing the purchaser to act in reliance
upon it; and (2) the purchaser suffered pecuniary loss as a result
77
of his justifiable reliance.
Only a minority of courts 78 has recognized the tort of innocent
misrepresentation in the real estate broker liability context. 79 Nevertheless, this form of action is effective because the purchaser need
only prove that he justifiably relied on a misrepresentation of material

to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or
negligently.
.RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977). The Restatement (Second)
leaves open the question whether such a cause of action may be brought against
real estate brokers. See id. § 552C(1) comment g.

77. See supra note 76.
78. The following jurisdictions recognize a cause of action by a purchaser of
property against a real estate broker for the latter's innocent misrepresentation or
nondisclosure of property defects: Alaska, see Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757
(Alaska 1982); District of Columbia, see Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82 (D.C.
1954); Illinois, see Buzzard v. Bolger, 117 Ill. App. 3d 887, 453 N.E.2d 1129
(1983); Minnesota, see Berryman v. Riegert, 286 Minn. 270, 175 N.W.2d 438 (1970);
South Carolina, see Lawlor v. Scheper, 232 S.C. 94, 101 S.E.2d 269 (1957); Texas,
see Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Harper, 386 S.W.2d 588 (Texas Ct. App. 1965); Utah,
see Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); Wisconsin, see Guaerke v. Rozga,
112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983).
79. Some courts and commentators have lauded the application of innocent

misrepresentation to residential real estate transactions. For example, the Bevins
court held that "[als between a broker who communicated the misrepresentation,
and the purchaser whose only fault was to rely on the broker .

.

. it [is] preferable

that the broker bear any loss caused by misrepresentation." Bevins, 655 P.2d at
763; see also Note, Realtor Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation and Undiscovered Defects: Balancing the Equities Between Broker and Buyer, 20 VAL. U.L.
REv. 255, 267 (1986) (justifiable buyer reliance and purchaser expectations of broker-

buyer relationship stated as reasons for imposition of innocent misrepresentation
liability) [hereinafter Balancing the Equities].
In contrast, other courts and commentators have sharply criticized the finding
of liability for innocent misrepresentation in the broker-purchaser relationship. See
Hoffman v. Connall, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 75-78, 736 P.2d 242, 245-246 (1987) ("[w]e
perceive no persuasive reason to hold real estate brokers to a higher standard of
care than other professionals must satisfy ....

Real estate agents and brokers are

not liable for innocently and nonnegligently conveying a seller's misrepresentation
to a buyer"); see also Bevins, 655 P.2d at 764 (Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent

in Bevins equated recognition of a cause of action for innocent misrepresentation
to imposition of strict liability and stated, "[tihere is no reason to make the broker
the 'insurer' of the seller's representation." Id.; accord Prigge v. South Seventh
Realty, 97 Nev. 640, 640, 637 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1981) (court refused to find liability

based on innocent misrepresentation); Note, Easton v. Strassburger: Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Inspect on California Real Estate Brokers, 18 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 809, 818 (1985) (arguing that broker should not be required to disclose defects
to purchaser because broker has fiduciary duty to act solely in interest of seller).
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fact made by the real estate broker. 0 Under this theory of liability,
a broker's knowledge that a representation is false or his intention
that a purchaser rely on the representation is irrelevant. 8' Thus, the
purchaser need not prove the broker's subjective intent. 82 Furthermore, even if the broker believed that the representation was true,
based on statements made by the seller,83 the broker may be liable
84
if the representation was in fact false.
B.

The Element of Duty

It is settled that in an action for intentional misrepresentation, 85
a broker has a duty to refrain from fraudulently inducing a prospective purchaser to enter into a transaction.8 6 In an action for
negligent misrepresentation 7 or innocent misrepresentation,"8 however, the basis and scope of a duty owed to a prospective purchaser

80. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion
of innocent misrepresentation in the real estate broker liability context, see Balancing
the Equities, supra note 79.
81. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. This form of action closely
resembles a products liability action under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (emphasis added).
One court has used this products liability approach to impose broker liability
for misrepresentation of defective real estate. See Berman v. Watergate West, Inc.,
391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978). It is important to emphasize, however, that in Berman
the broker was actually a subsidiary of the building's seller. See id. Thus, the
holding may be limited to cases in which the broker and seller are essentially one
entity. The Berman decision has been criticized as an overextension of the law of
products liability. See Products Liability, supra note 4.
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. Or even if the broker believed that the representation was true based on
independent investigation. See infra note 84.
84. See Gauerke, 112 Wis. 2d at 281, 332 N.W.2d at 809 (in some situations,
innocent broker, rather than innocent purchaser, should bear loss).
85. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
86. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 740-45.
87. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
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by the broker is much less clear.8 9 The discussion below sets forth
the theories under which a broker may have a duty to a prospective
purchaser.
1. Agency

According to general principles of agency law, a real estate broker
acting as agent for the seller has a duty to faithfully and honestly
represent the seller. The broker, however, owes no duties to third

parties. 90 Thus, a purchaser traditionally could not rely on agency
as a basis for establishing duty in an action for misrepresentation.
The broker could claim that, absent an employment relationship, 9'
no agency was created; hence the broker owed no duty to the
purchaser.92

89. See Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1982), ("courts
have historically struggled with the nature and source of real estate broker . . .
duties"), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 347(2) (1958). Furthermore, according to general agency principles, an agent is permitted to repeat information
from his principal without fear of liability should the information prove untrue,
unless the agent knows or has reason to know of its falsity. See id. § 348 comment
b (1979).
91. Employment is one method of creating agency. See generally H. REUSCILEIN
GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIPS § 12, at
31 (1979) [hereinafter REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY]. The parties create an agency
relationship only when one person intends for another to act on his behalf and
the other person consents to represent him. See id. Thus, consent of both parties
& W.

is required to create an agency relationship. See id. An agency relationship normally
arises when a seller enters a multiple listing agreement with a real estate broker.
See supra note 36; see also Marra v. Katz, 74 Misc. 2d 1010, 1012-13, 347 N.Y.S.2d
143, 146-47 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973) (multiple listing services assume

cooperating broker is subagent of listing broker, thus, the agent of the seller).
Unlike the seller, who usually enters a written listing agreement with the real estate
broker, the purchaser generally has no such writing defining the duties of the
parties to one another.
92. According to agency principles, a real estate broker is not liable to a purchaser
for a misrepresentation in a real estate transaction when the broker states that the
representation is derived from the principal (seller), and the facts from which the
representations are made are not such as would be peculiarly within the broker's
knowledge. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 91, § 118, at 182 (when agent
discloses existence and identity of principal to third party, agent has no liability).
It is, of course, possible for the purchaser to enter an agency relationship with
a real estate broker in which the purchaser is the principal. When this occurs, the
broker has the duty to act with utmost good faith and loyalty in the interest of
his principal-the purchaser. See id. §§ 68-69, at 122-24. This obligation of good
faith and loyalty would include an obligation to disclose defects known to or
reasonably ascertainable by the broker. See id.
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Recently, however, some courts have begun to infer dualagency 93 in the broker-purchaser-seller relationship. 94 In a dual-agency
context, the broker is the express agent 95 for the seller and the
implied agent 96 for the purchaser. Dual-agency status creates several
problems for the real estate broker. 97 The broker has a duty of
good faith and loyalty9" to, both parties-each of whose interest is

adverse to the other's. 99 Furthermore, the legal fiction of implied
dual-agency'0° is contrary to the principles of agency,

0I°

which require

93. The broker, when acting as a middleman in effecting the sale or exchange
of property, acts in a certain sense as the agent of both parties to the transaction.
See Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Wyo. 1985) ("broker is held to owe
a duty to both the seller who employs him and the buyer to whom real estate is
sold").
94. See id., see also Lerk v. McCabe, 349 I11.348, 182 N.E. 388 (1932).
95. An agency relationship is expressly created by a multiple listing agreement,
see supra note 56, or by express agreement of the parties. See supra note 91.
96. A court may infer an agency relationship by the course of conduct between
the parties. See supra note 93.
97. The broker in an implied dual-agency relationship may be unable to ascertain
his obligations to both of his principals. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text. The extent to which a broker may disclose defective property conditions while
preserving his duty as agent for both principals is unclear. See id. While several
writers have addressed the problem of dual-agency in the broker-purchaser context,
none has set forth an effective solution to the problems it creates. See, e.g., Note,
Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging MalpracticeDoctrine,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 757 (1978) [hereinafter Arizona's Emerging MalpracticeDoctrine];
Note, Real Estate Broker's Duties to Prospective Purchasers-Funk v. Tift, 1976
B.Y.U. L. REV. 513; Note, A Re-examination of the Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343 (1972) [hereinafter Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship]. As one commentator stated, "[tihis [confusion] is to be expected, since
the law of agency is predicated on the fundamental principle that an agent can
represent only one set of interests." Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers
and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 264
(1981).
98. See REUSCH EIN & GREGORY, supra note 91,

§§ 68-69, at 122-24.

99. The seller is interested in obtaining the highest possible purchase price and
the purchaser, in negotiating the lowest acceptable purchase price. Courts have held
that a person employing a broker to sell property is entitled to recover from the
broker both the commission that he himself has paid and that paid by the buyer,
when the broker has taken a commission from the purchaser. See Wechsler v.
Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E.2d 322 (1941).
100. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
101. An agent may not represent any interests adverse to those of his principal
in transactions that involve the subject matter of his agency without the principal's
full knowledge and consent. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 91, § 68, at
122. Furthermore, the agent may rely on the principal's representations unless he
knows or should know that the principal's representations are untrue. See id.
§ 125, at 195; see also Prigge v. South Seventh Realty, 97 Nev. 640, 640, 637
P.2d 1222, 1223 (1981) (broker not liable for innocent misrepresentation because he
properly relied on statements of seller).
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the full knowledge and consent of both parties in order for the
broker to act as a dual-agent in a transaction. 10 2 Recognizing the
problems inherent in this dual-agency status, 103 other courts have
focused on different bases for holding that a broker owes a duty

to the purchaser./°4
2.

Public Policy

Implied in any agency-principal relationship are the duties of a
fiduciary-loyalty, good faith, care, and disclosure.105 Some courtsY06
however, find a fiduciary duty even when no agency relationship

exists between the parties." °7 To support findings that a broker owes
a fiduciary duty to a purchaser, some courts rely on public policy
considerations 8 coupled with the real estate broker's role in a typical

real estate transaction./°9
One example of a court finding a fiduciary duty in these circumstances is the Illinois appellate court's decision in Sawyer Realty
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 313, 391-392 (1958).
103. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 105-53 and accompanying text.
105. See Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1985); REuscIN & GREGORY,
supra note 91, §§ 68-69' at 122-24.
106. See, e.g., Hughey v. Rainwater Partners, 661 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983) ("[w]here a broker acts as an intermediary between a seller and purchaser
•.. broker is under a duty to deal fairly and honestly with both parties"); accord
Gouveia v.- Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d
262 (1984) (broker's duties based upon status as a fiduciary).
107. A fiduciary relationship is created when one party places great trust and
confidence in another due to the latter's representation of superior knowledge and
skill. See J. POMEROY, EQUITY AND JURISPRUDENCE §§ 902, 956, at 550, 789 (5th
ed. 1941). For a detailed discussion of the fiduciary nature of the real estate brokerpurchaser relationship, see Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, supra note 97.
108. See, e.g., Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981) (real estate broker's
duty is to an extent determined by public policy). The Hagar court explained its
holding in the following manner:
The underlying rationale of [a real estate broker's] duty to a buyer who
is not his client is that he is . . .in a unique position to verify critical

information given him by the seller. His duty is to take reasonable steps
to avoid disseminating to the buyer false information .... The broker

is required to employ a reasonable degree of effort and professional
expertise to confirm or refute information from the seller which he
knows, or should know, is pivotal to the transaction from the buyer's
perspective.
Id. at 137-38 (citing Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305,
1309-10 (1980) (citations omitted). The Hagar court further stated that "[r]ealtors,
just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold themselves
out as professionals; it is their job to know their profession. People rely on and
trust them." Hagar, 638 P.2d at 138.
109. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
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Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp."0 The Sawyer court held that since real
estate brokers occupy a position of trust with respect to prospective
purchasers with whom they are negotiating, they have a duty to
exercise good faith in their dealings with such purchasers, even in

the absence of an agency relationship."' Thus, some courts do not
hesitate to hold that a real estate broker owes a duty to a purchaser
on the basis of public policy considerations." 2 Other courts, however,
rely on statutes to find that a broker owes a duty to a prospective
purchaser." 3
3.

Statutory Duty
Several courts have used a statutory basis' 14 to hold that a real

estate broker owes a duty to a prospective purchaser." 5 A state may,
under its general police power," 6 regulate the business of real estate
brokers," 7 including the imposition of licensing requirements." 8 Courts

110. 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982).
111. See id. at 386, 432 N.E.2d at 852; see also Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d
1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (when broker negotiates for both vendor and vendee,
broker must relay accurate information because both parties rely on his knowledge
and expertise), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1983).
112. See, e.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432
N.E.2d 849 (1982); Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (La. 1982); Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981).
113. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
114. The broker's duty arises from state real estate broker licensing acts or state
consumer protection acts. See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Earle, McMillan & Niemeyer, Inc. v. Dekle, 418 So. 2d 97 (Ala.
1982) (real estate brokers subject to professional standards under state licensing
code); Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 720 P.2d 660 (1986) (action
for damages against Kansas real estate broker may be predicated on negligent
violation of state broker licensing act); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173,
646 P.2d 771 (1982) (primary purpose of real estate broker licensing acts is to
promote minimum standard of conduct for those engaged in the business), aff'd,
101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984).
116. See Groetzinger v.Forest Hills Terrace Corp., 123 Misc. 274, 205 N.Y.S.
125 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1924) (validity of real estate broker licensing
statute as lawful exercise of police power sustained).
117. See Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 152 N.E. 461 (1926) (legislature acts
within law when it establishes system for licensing real estate brokers).
118. For the brokerage licensing laws of each state, see ALA. CODE § 34-27-1
to 38 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.161 to 261 (1982); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-2121 to 2133 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1301 to 1306 (1979); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 10000-30, 10150 to 10165 (West 1964 & Supp. 1987); CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 12-61-101 to 110 (1978 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-311 to 314 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987)i DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2907-11
(Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1921 to 1951 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 475.001 to 475.486 (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-40-7 to 32 (1984); HAW.
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have found that the primary purpose of real estate broker licensing
acts is to protect the general welfare of the public" 9 and to promote
a minimum standard of conduct for those engaged in the business
of real estate in the capacity of a broker.' 20 Because state licensing
statutes sometimes fail to provide specifically for a private cause of
action,' 21 some courts will not consider these acts as a basis for
holding that a real estate broker owes a duty to a prospective
22
purchaser. 1

§ 467-1 to 30 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 54-2022 to 2053 (1979 & Supp.
1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5701 to 5743 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp.
1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-3-2 to 3-4.1 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 117.1 to 117.30 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3035 to 3075 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 324.010 to 324.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp. 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1431 to 1459 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4001 to 4119 (Supp. 1984); MD. Bus. Occ. CODE ANN. art. 56,
§§ 212-232A (1983 & Supp. 1984); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 87SS-TT (Law.
Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1987); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.425 (Callaghan Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82.17 to .34 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-35-1 to 3535 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.010 to .170 (1959); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 37-51-102 to 512 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-885.01 to .46 (1986);
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 645.230 to .840 (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 331-A:1 to A:8 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-1 to 15-16 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-29-2 to 27 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§§ 440 to 442 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-1 to 38 (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-23-05 to 14.1 (1978 & Supp. 1987); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 4735.01 to .99 (Page Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 858-101
to 401 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 696.007 to .990 (Supp. 1983); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101 to .608 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 5-20.5-2 to .19 (1976 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-57-10 to 240 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 36-21-1 to 73 (1986 & Supp.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-301 to 320 (1986); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6573a, §§ 1-20 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 to 23 (1986
& Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2291-2299 (1975 & Supp. 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-740 to 749 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.85.090,
.100 to .150, .161 to .271 (1978 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-12-1 to 23
(1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 452.01 to .22 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 33-28-101 to 122 (Supp. 1987).
119. See Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 330, 720 P.2d 660,
665 (1986) ("purpose of the [real estate broker licensing] act is clearly to require
high standards of conduct by real estate brokers licensed in this state, and to
protect the members of the public who deal with real estate brokers").
120. See 2 Park Ave. Assocs. v. Cross & Brown Co., 36 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 327
N.E.2d 632, 633, 367 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (1975) (purpose of New York brokerage
licensing statute is to assure standards of competency, honesty and professionalism).
121. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-40-7 to 32 (1984).
122. See Campagna v. Sara Hudson Realty Co., 137 Ga. App. 451, 224 S.E.2d
102 (1976). The Campagna court held that the section of the real estate broker
licensing statute "relating to establishment and maintenance of a real estate recovery
fund" does not create a private cause of action. Id. at 452, 224 S.E.2d at 102.
Contra Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 239 Kan. 324, 720 P.2d 660 (1986)
REv. STAT.
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Other courts have relied upon state consumer protection statutes
as the basis for a broker's duty to a prospective purchaser. 23 Some
courts rely on the underlying policy of consumer protection statutes
to find a basis for a broker's duty, even though the statute may
fail to provide a private cause of action 24 in real property transactions. 25 Thus, the existence of a statutory duty running from a

broker to a purchaser will often depend on the language of an

individual state's -consumer protection statute 26 or broker licensing
statute' 27 and the manner in which the courts interpret them.1 2 When
courts cannot reasonably interpret existing statutory language to

impose a duty on a broker, courts have justified a broker's duty
29
to a prospective purchaser on other grounds.
4. Ethical Codes
Courts have also used real estate broker's associations' ethical
codes 3 ° to find that a broker owes a duty to a prospective pur-

(because prerequisite for making claim against real estate recovery fund is final
judgment in lawsuit in which cause of action is based upon violation of real estate
broker's license act, licensing act may be the basis of such suits).
123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.710(a)(1) (1983) (person commits crime of
deceptive business practices if he makes false statement in connection with promotion
of sale of property); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, paras. 267-72, 311 to -17
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (action lies against broker for misrepresentations under
consumer acts); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 -.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(imposing liability on sellers and their real estate brokers for misstatements regardless
of scienter, and for knowing nondislosures of facts); see also Straus v. Latter &
Blum, Inc., 431 So. 2d 9 (La. Ct. App.) (broker liable for nondisclosure under
state deceptive trade practices act if defect known to him), cert. denied, 438 So.
2d 572 (La. 1983); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 407 N.E.2d 352
(1980) (broker's failure to disclose material fact that could influence buyer actionable
under state deceptive trade practices act); McRae v. Bolstead, 32 Wash. App. 173,
646 P.2d 771 (1982) (broker has duty under state consumer protection act to disclose
matters known to him), aff'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984).
124. A statute may not explicitly provide for a private cause of action in real
property transactions. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-921 (1979).
125. See Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975) (finding real estate broker
liability based on state consumer protection statute forbidding concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely).
126. See supra note 123.
127. See supra note 118.
128. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate Bd., 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1956). The National Association of Realtors, a voluntary association
composed of real estate boards throughout the United States, promulgates a Code
of Ethics for its members. See FISHER, supra note 2, app. A. Local real estate
brokerage associations may have their own codes of ethics to which members are
expected to adhere.
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chaser. 3 ' Easton v. Strassburger presents a striking example of a
court's use of an ethical code as a basis for a broker's duty in an
action for misrepresentation. 3 2 The Easton court held that a real
estate broker had a duty to inspect for defects and to disclose them
to a prospective purchaser.'
The Easton court relied in part on
the National Association of Realtor's Code of Ethics, 3 4 but also
focused on policy reasons' for imposing such a duty upon a broker,
stating that the "primary purposes [of imposing a duty] are to
protect the buyer from the unethical broker and seller and to insure
that the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information to make
'3 6
an informed decision whether to purchase."'
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in Menzel v. Morse, 3 7 relied
on the National Association of Realtor's Code of Ethics 3 ' as a basis
for its holding that a broker owed a duty to a prospective purchaser. 13 9
The Menzel court stated that "courts have turned to published ethical
standards and practices of real estate brokers to determine the
requisite skill and knowledge, and acceptable practices, of members
i 40
in good standing in that occupation."'
Article 9 of the National Association of Realtor's Code of Ethics,
states that a real estate broker must "avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or concealment of pertinent facts [and] has an affirmative
obligation to discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent
and diligent investigation would disclose."'' 4' Thus, if a court uses
this Code of Ethics as a basis for finding that a broker owes a
duty to a prospective purchaser, it may impose a greater duty of
care than that which would be required under an action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.142 Rather than merely having
the duty to use reasonable care to refrain from making a material

131.
(1984);
Estate
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383
Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985); Hoey v. San Antonio Real
Bd., 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).
152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
See id.at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
See id.at 101-03, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
See id.at 99-102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388-90.
Id.at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985).

138. See supra note 130.
139. Menzel, 362 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1985) (violation by broker of code of ethics
provides evidence of negligence in malpractice action).
140. Id.at 472 (emphasis added).
141. FISHER, supra note 2, app. A., art. 9 (emphasis added).
142. In an action for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove that
the broker failed to exercise reasonable care. See supra note 73.
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misrepresentation of fact 143 to a prospective purchaser, a broker may
have a duty to inspect for and to disclose the existence of any defect
located on the property in question. 1"
5.

Malpractice

A malpractice theory' 45 may also be used by courts as a basis for
finding that a broker owes a duty to a prospective purchaser. Because
of an amendment to the Arizona State Constitution,'" for example,
it is possible that an Arizona purchaser may bring an action against
a broker for malpractice. Arizona's constitutional amendment granted
brokers a limited right to engage in the practice of law. 47 Because
real estate brokers now have a limited right to prepare legal documents in real estate transactions,' 41 they are subject to certain duties
with respect to these transactions. For example, a recent Arizona
case, Morely v. J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, 49 discussed a broker's
duties to a purchaser and stated that without regard to whether a
relationship exists between the parties, brokers have a duty to explain
the implications of documents they prepare. 50 The Morely court
determined that "[flailure to do so may constitute real estate malpractice."' 5' Although the Morely court specifically limited its holding

143. "A material fact is one 'to which a reasonable man might be expected to
attach importance in making his choice of action.' " Cousineau v. Walker, 613
P.2d 608, 613 (Alaska 1980) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 719
(4th ed. 1971)).
144. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)
(duty to inspect for and disclose defects); see also Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate
Bd., 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956) (by voluntarily joining association of
real estate brokers, broker agrees to certain limitations upon his activities and is
bound by its code of ethics).
145. See Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985) (appeal from district
court judgment denying purchaser damages in malpractice action against broker).
146. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 26,

§ 1 (1984).

147. Article 26, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution provides:
Any person holding a valid license as a real estate broker or a real estate
salesman regularly issued by the Arizona State Real Estate Department
when acting in such capacity as broker or salesman for the parties, or
agent for one of the parties to a sale, exchange, or trade, or the renting
and leasing of property, shall have the right to draft or fill out and
complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident thereto including, but not limited to, preliminary purchase agreements and earnest
money receipts, deeds, mortgages, leases, assignments, releases, contracts
for sale of realty, and bills of sale.
Id.
148. See supra note 147.

149. 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976).
150. See id. at 65-66, 550 P.2d at 1107-08.
151. Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 1108.
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to the broker's client (the seller), 5 2 at least one commentator has
53
advocated its application to a prospective purchaser.
Thus, as the previous sections have outlined, courts have relied
on several theories to find that a real estate broker owes a duty to
a prospective purchaser. 5 4 Because the courts have asserted disparate
theories as the basis of a broker's duty to a prospective purchaser,
a broker may be unsure of his obligations to the parties to the
transaction. 5 5 Similarly, even when the broker is aware that he owes
a duty to a purchaser, he may be unsure of what that duty entailswhether it is a duty to refrain from making an affirmative misrepresentation, a duty to disclose all facts that he knows or should
have known, or a duty to inspect the property and disclose any
56
problems. 1
C.

The Scope of Duty Owed to a Prospective Purchaser

In short, the standards courts have developed for determining the
scope of the broker's duty are not clearly defined.'5 7 The standards
are unclear because courts in different jurisdictions have reached
different conclusions as to the scope of the broker's duty. For
example, a California court recently held that a real estate broker
has an affirmative duty to investigate the property and to disclose
to a prospective purchaser any defects discovered. 15 8 By contrast, in
Provost v. Miller,'59 a Vermont court reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that "[rjeal estate brokers and agents are marketing agents,
not structural engineers or contractors" who "have no duty to verify
independently representations made by a seller unless they are aware
of facts that 'tend to indicate that such [representations are] false.' "160
An Ohio court 161 went even further when it held that caveat emptor
still applies to circumstances in which the property has no latent
1 62
defects and any conditions in question are open to observation.
These cases illustrate that courts have failed to achieve a uniform

152. Id. at 65, 550 P.2d at 1107.

153. See generally Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, supra note 97.
154. See supra notes 90-153 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 92, 123, 142, 144 and accompanying text.

156. See id.
157. See .infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
158. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
159. 144 Vt. 67, 473 A.2d 1162 (1984).
160. Id. at 69-70, 473 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church,

71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 259-60, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1979)).
161. See Sanfillipo v. Rarden, 24 Ohio App. 3d 164, 493 N.E.2d 991 (1985).
162. See id. at 167, 493 N.E.2d at 995.
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standard for defining the scope of a broker's duty. Accordingly, the
majority of jurisdictions set forth the scope of duty owed to the
prospective purchaser on a case-by-case basis. 163 As a result, even

if a real estate broker is aware that he owes a duty' 64 to a prospective
purchaser, unless the broker has read the most recent case law in
his state, he will be unable to ascertain the full extent of his
obligations to either the seller or the purchaser in a given trans-

action. 165
IV.

A Critical Analysis of the Imposition of Broker Liability

A recent Federal Trade Commission study found that "[o]ver the

years, brokers have carried on the business of brokerage by dealing
with both parties without much concern about the technical legal
requirements of agency law and fiduciary relationships. 1 '

66

Courts

that recognize a cause of action for innocent or negligent
misrepresentation

67

against a real estate broker have incorporated

similar statements into their opinions. 168 For example, one opinion
noted:
Real estate brokers and their agents hold themselves out to the
public as having specialized knowledge with regard to housing,
housing conditions and related matters. The public is entitled to
and does rely on the expertise of real estate brokers in the purchase
and sale of its homes. Therefore, there is a duty on the part of
real estate brokers to be accurate and knowledgeable concerning
the product they are in the business of selling-that is, homes
169
and other types of real estate.

These courts are following a trend that imposes broker liability for
misrepresentation or nondisclosure on a result-oriented basis.170 After
163. See generally supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
165. See id.
166. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1196 n.345 (citing 1 FTC Los Angeles
Regional Office, The Residential Real EstateBrokerage Industry 8, 346 (Dec. 1983)).
167. See supra notes 70-72, 78 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (policy favoring
liability is based on recognition that purchasers should be able to rely on brokers'
representations); Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383
(1984) (imposition of broker's duty is warranted because of magnitude of benefit
conferred on purchasers and ease with which burden can be sustained by brokers);
Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983) (public opinion calls
for placing loss on defendant).
169. Lyons, 71 111. App. 3d at 264, 389 N.E.2d at 628 (Moran, J., dissenting).
170. See supra note 30.
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determining that the purchaser should recover for losses sustained
because he had relied on the broker's misrepresentation or nondisclosure, such courts then find some basis for imposing broker li7
ability.1 1
Imposition of such liability, however, fails to address any of the
expectations of the purchaser-broker relationship. 72 The imposition
of broker liability for repeating a seller's representation in good
faith, ' 3 for making an innocent misrepresentation,' 74 or for failing
to inspect a property for defects 75 will increase the likelihood of76
real estate transactions tainted with misinformation and confusion.'
Although the application of a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair
dealing 77 to a real estate broker is appropriate, given his status as
a professional in the transaction, 78 it is only equitable that the
broker should know precisely what this duty entails prior to entering
79
into a transaction.
At least one court ignored these considerations when it held that
broker liability was appropriate because "[a]ny other rule would

permit brokers to use misleading statements in selling the property,
yet remain immune from liability by simply remaining ignorant of
the property's true characteristics."' 80 In making this determination,

the court did not focus on the probable outcome of its decisionnamely, that in jurisdictions in which a broker is held accountable

171. See supra notes 90-153 and accompanying text.
172. For example, the seller expects the broker to sell his property at the highest
possible price, as quickly as possible. See KRATOVIL & WERNER, supra note 1, at
115. The broker expects to earn a commission by introducing the seller to the
purchaser. See id. at 99-102 (traditionally, broker earns his commission when he
produces buyer who is "ready, willing, and able" to complete the transaction).
The purchaser expects to obtain information about the property in question and
other similar properties in the area. See id. at 114-19.
. 173. See Hoffman v. Connal, 43 Wash. App. 532, 718 P.2d 814 (1986) (broker
liability for innocent misrepresentation where broker merely repeated seller's representations), rev'd, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 736 P.2d 242 (1987).
174. See Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
175. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984)
(broker had duty to inspect).
176. See Arizona'1 Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, supra note 97, at 782-83
(asserting that cautious broker will make few representations to buyer because he
could be held liable for false statements).
177. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
178. See Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985) (broker's status as
professional gives duty to act in good faith with all parties to transaction).
179. In order to carry out the brokerage business within the framework of the
law and to meet his obligations to both the seller and the purchaser, the broker
must know his obligations to all parties to the transaction.
180. Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
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for innocent misrepresentations, he will attempt to avoid liability

by not making any statements concerning the property.''

Thus,

because courts have used a case-by-case basis to determine the
existence and scope of a duty owed to a purchaser without considering
the potential adverse consequences of their decisions, a need for

legislation remains.

2

1

V.

Recommendations

As early as 1926, Justice Cardozo stated "[tihe intrinsic nature

of the [brokerage] business combines with practice and tradition to
attest the need of regulation." 3 Although states have enacted statutes
governing the licensing of real estate brokers,8 4 they have failed to
examine the purchaser-broker relationship and to set forth the precise
duties a real estate broker owes to a prospective purchaser.8 5
State legislatures must address this issue and set forth regulations
containing coherent express guidelines for practicing brokers and the
general public. One approach, which would achieve the policy goals
of protecting the innocent purchaser, would be to enact regulations

that would prevent the transfer of defective real estate'

6

without

87

making the broker the "insurer"'
of the transaction. Such legislation
should require a broker to disclose fully to prospective purchasers
the inherent conflict' presented by the broker's representation of
both the purchaser and the seller in a transaction. This disclosure

prevents an inexperienced investor from assuming that the broker

89
represents his interests.

Furthermore, legislatures concerned with consumer protection should
impose requirements regulating the transfer of real estate. For example, requiring the purchaser to obtain a structural report,' 9° a
181. See supra note 176. In addition, to avoid liability for nondisclosure, the
broker will represent the property "as is," a phrase that has been upheld as a
limit to liability for any implied warranty. See Freyfogle, supra note 11, at 42-43
(discussing "as is" clause used to limit broker liability).
182. See supra notes 49-181 and accompanying text.
183. Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 54, 152 N.E. 461, 462 (1926).
184. See supra note 118.
185. See De Soto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (failing to
define precise scope of broker's duties).
186. See supra note 5.
187. See Bevins, 655 P.2d at 764 (Alaska 1982) (Conner, J., dissenting) ("no
reason to make the broker the 'insurer' of the seller's representation").
188. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
189. See generally ARNOLD & KUSNET, supra note 4, at 511 (prevent reliance by
disclosure and avoid liability for misrepresentation).
190. See generally H. HOAGLAND, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES 54 (1940) (describing
problem relating to physical condition of property).
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survey, 9 1 and a termite inspection 92 prior to the transfer of any
property would prevent later discovery of many defects upon which

purchasers' suits are often based.' 93 These requirements seemingly
place the economic burden of inspection upon the purchaser. 94 While
the costs of obtaining a structural report, a survey, and a termite
inspection may be several hundred dollars, the costs are minimal in
comparison to the purchaser's total investment. 95 Furthermore, the
purchaser would pay these costs anyway-in the form of higher

brokerage commissions-if the broker had an affirmative duty to
inspect and disclose, or was subject to liability for innocent mis-

representation.

96

Thus, legislatures must decide the basis of real

estate broker liability and the scope of duty owed to a prospective

purchaser to permit the broker to carry on his business within the
97
framework of the law.
VI. Conclusion
Real estate brokers are professionals who facilitate residential real
estate transactions by bringing the purchaser and seller together.
Imposition of broker liability for misrepresentation and nondisclosure
on a case-by-case basis is not an equitable solution to the problem
of the transfer of defective real estate. A more effective and equitable
remedy is a legislative determination of the rights and responsibilities

191. For a discussion of surveys, see R. KRATOVL, MODERN
39-50 (1975).

REAL

ESTATE Doc-

UMENTATION

192. See ARNOLD & KUSNET, supra note 4, at 832.
193. See supra note 2.
194. The costs, however, would likely be passed on anyway, if these duties are
imposed on the broker. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
195. See A.

ARNOLD, C. WURTZEBACH

& M.

MILES, MODERN REAL ESTATE

17-

19 (1980).
196. See Imposing Tort Liability, supra note 59, at 1872; supra note 60 and
accompanying text. If a broker has a duty to disclose defects or is subject to
liability for innocent misrepresentation, the only way that he can protect himself
is to hire the services of a professional to perform the inspection and disclosure
obligations for him. See id.
197. Until legislatures address the issue of broker liability in residential real estate
transactions, a broker should take several steps in order to protect himself. First,
a broker should inform the purchaser that he represents the seller and explain that
his role is that of an intermediary. Second, if a broker cannot truthfully answer
an inquiry regarding the property he is attempting to sell, he should admit his
lack of knowledge. Third, a broker should recommend that the purchaser engage
the services of an experienced real estate attorney. Finally, a broker should suggest
that the purchaser obtain structural reports, surveys and termite inspections prior
to purchasing the property in question.

154
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of the parties-where a broker owes a duty of good faith, but not
a duty of inspection, to a purchaser.
Dawn K. McGee

